Cred ca am oscilat intre a considera drept importante (din punct de vedere logic, ca sa spun asa) relatiile de conditionare necesara dintre actiuni si a considera importante relatiile ce decurg din asumarea raspunderii fata de anumite lucruri (in cadrul unor actiuni).
Archive for the ‘idei’ Category
Actiuni si raspundere
Wednesday, February 6th, 2013In timpul liber,…
Saturday, January 12th, 2013Ma gandeam la “extraordinar de interesant” si “neobisnuit de interesant” (pornind de la ceva spus la un moment dat de fiul meu). Mi se spune, sa zicem, ca o intamplare e extraordinar de interesanta. Inteleg: “Pentru majoritatea lucrurilor interesante, y e mai interesant decat acele lucruri.” si, datorita regulii “Orice y care e ‘mai F’ decat ceva (care este F) este F.”, conchid ca acea intamplare e interesanta.
Pe de alta parte, daca mi se spune ca o intamplare e neobisnuit de interesanta, inteleg ca faptul ca acea intamplare e interesanta este neobisnuit. Daca acea intamplare nu ar fi interesanta, ar fi lipsit de sens sa mi se spuna ca faptul ca este interesanta e neobisnuit, de unde conchid ca intamplarea respectiva e interesanta.
Dar prima concluzie am tras-o in virtutea unei relatii de consecinta logica, in timp ce pe a doua am tras-o in virtutea relatiei dintre o afirmatie si presupozitiile acesteia.
Si asa ajung la un leitmotiv al filosofiei analitice – forma gramaticala ascunde forma logica. 🙂
Alte insemnari
Friday, December 21st, 2012Le voi transcrie aici, fiindca imi e mai usor sa le adun la un loc in felul acesta. Ca de obicei, nimic din ce e aici nu mi se pare publicabil.
Boetius despre pretuirea lucrurilor materiale – un comentariu
Friday, October 19th, 2012Aşa s-a răsturnat ordinea lucrurilor, incit o fiinţă cu adevărat divină prin raţiunea sa să creadă că nu poate străluci prin altceva decit prin posesiunea unor obiecte neinsufleţite? (Boetius, Mangaierile filosofiei, Fundaţia Gândirea, Bucuresti, 2003, p. 69)
Continuarea postului precedent
Wednesday, September 26th, 2012In ce sens poate fi o greseala morala inevitabila? Pana la urma, e vorba fie despre o actiune pe care eu o realizez, fie despre una pe care aleg sa nu o realizez (desi ar fi trebuit sa o fac). Trebuie sa existe loc pentru o alegere, pentru cursuri de actiune alternative. Altfel, cum se mai poate vorbi despre responsabilitate?
My problem with the Reason-Knowledge Principle
Tuesday, July 17th, 2012Whatever your definition for ‘S knows that p’ is, I take it that p being true figures as a necessary condition in that definition. Now, according to my (perhaps inaccurate) understanding of the pragmatist tradition, for p to be (or ‘to become’) true, our actions based on p have to be successful. In other words, being conducive to successful action seems to be at least a necessary condition in a pragmatist analysis of truth.
Now, what does ‘acting on p’ mean? Could it be possible for someone to act on p but reject p as a reason for his or her actions? (I have tried to figure out such cases without success.)
So here comes my problem with the Reason-Knowledge Principle, as stated in Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason, Knowledge and Action, Journal of Philosophy, 105.10 (2008): 571-90.
RKP says that: “Where one’s choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p.”. Since the principle makes ‘knowing that p’ a necessary condition for treating p as a reason for acting, it would render all definitions of knowledge relying on the pragmatist view on truth circular.
However, shouldn’t such a principle be neutral with respect to our theoretical understanding of knowledge?
Grafuri conceptuale?
Thursday, July 12th, 2012M-am jucat un pic cu Gephi:
Sagetile exprima relatia “intelegerea conceptului A presupune drept conditie necesara intelegerea conceptului B”. N-am fost consecvent in ce priveste tranzitivitatea relatiei respective (inca nu mi-e clar de ce).
Promisiuni (2)
Wednesday, June 13th, 2012Am I a compatibilist about free will?
Monday, June 11th, 2012Let me see. I can, for instance, think of the following example. Somebody tells me that I am an automaton and all the things I will do in the future are already written in a book. Suppose, in addition, that I am presented with conclusive evidence, so that I start to believe what I am told.
Even in this case, I would not be able to give up considering myself responsible (morally or otherwise) for my actions. (Were I made by this example to stop considering myself responsible for my actions, it would not be as if I was convinced by an argument – that would be something happening to me.)
So I cannot stop considering myself responsible for my actions, even if my actions, regarded as natural events, would be described by determinist laws, could be predicted entirely by someone else a.s.o.