Category Archives: filosofie

New book (in Romanian)

filosofie, viata academica

Here it is:

Stefanov - Introducere in filosofie - instrumente de lucru

You can read a bit more about it here (also in Romanian). In short, the book is meant to be used primarily by students taking an Introduction to philosophy course in order to develop their “conceptual tweaking” (or “conceptual hacking”) abilities by trying to solve several philosophical puzzles, organized by different topics. The book is in a way similar to 101 Philosophy Problems, which inspired me to undertake such an academic project.

Reason, Actions, Nature

acte de vorbire, actiuni rationale, amintiri, cauzalitate, concepte, filosofia actiunii, filosofia limbajului, filosofia logicii, filosofia mintii, filosofie, idei, insemnari, intentii, metafilosofie, metastuff, naturalism, opinii, pragmatism, probleme, rationalitate, Wittgenstein

These are some notes which I wrote down in the last few months. I was thinking of writing a book, so I wrote in order to make the topic of my book a bit more clear. This is the only use of this text – to make it clear for myself what I am supposed to write about in my book. The only result of writing everything found here, which I would acknowledge, is that the title of my book should be ‘Reason, Language and Actions’. Nothing else should be taken seriously, nothing is worth mentioning etc. I did not proofread the text for grammar mistakes. If you want to take a look at it, you’re on your own.

Continue reading Reason, Actions, Nature →

On being together

filosofie, idei, insemnari

Here is a conceptual proposal for a way in which one could (partly) understand what “being together with someone else” means:

A is “together with” B ONLY IF:
A takes responsibility for her/his own life choices in front of B AND
B takes responsibility for her/his own life choices in front of A.

If: N is a necessary condition for P,
then: One cannot propose that P unless one proposes that N. (version: the proposal that P includes the proposal that N.)

So: Proposing that you “start being together” to someone else includes the proposal that both of you take responsibility for your own life choices in front of each other.

Note: Sincerity towards the other person with respect to all your life choices follows from this (you cannot be responsible in front of another person with respect to a life choice the other person knows nothing about).

Now: What distinguishes life choices from regular choices?

Here I do not think a conceptual analysis is required. When you know each other well you also know what the other person would consider a life choice. Also, instead of life choices one could speak of “what you’re doing with your life”. If one is unsure whether what one is doing counts for the other person as “doing something with one’s life”, one could always assume that it counts.

Side note: Naturally, this works for more than two people being together, too.

Methodological note: A proposed concept can be tested like any other artifact. A “beta tester” could just assume it and ask herself/himself:
– Does this concept accommodate my sense of being together with someone?
– Are there any intellectual troubles with respect to this particular relationship which could be alleviated by using this concept?
– Am I better guided in my actions (choosing to be together with someone or not, choosing what to do and what to refrain from doing when you are together with someone, etc.) by using this concept?
– Is there any overall improvement to my life as a result of conceiving being together with someone like this?
– Etc.

Three Drawings

actiuni rationale, amintiri, cauzalitate, concepte, diverse, filosofia actiunii, filosofie, idei, insemnari, metafilosofie, naturalism, pragmatism, probleme, , , ,

I’ve done the first one in an attempt to clarify my view of philosophy as a conceptual proposal:

image

The second expresses my thoughts about the dual nature of actions:

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In the third case I was trying to think of the different ways in which we understand the idea if necessity:

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They are related.