Category Archives: filosofia actiunii

A puzzle about actions

Here is a philosophical puzzle with respect to actions:
(1) If A is an action, then there is an event, E, such that A is identical to E.
(2) S is the agent of action A only if S causes E (A = E).
(3) An event can only be caused by another event.
(4) Persons are not events.

Therefore:
(5) A person can never be the agent of an action.

Also:
(6) S is the agent of an action only if S is a person.

Therefore:
(7) Actions do not have agents.
But:
(8) Actions do have agents.

[Also, one could write down “living being” instead of “person” in (4) and (6) and still infer (7)]

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Deviant Hinge Epistemology and Epistemic Angst

La sfârșitul săptămânii trecute am participat la Topics in Analytic Philosophy 3 cu o conferință cu acest titlu. Slide-urile se găsesc aici.

Un draft al textului pe baza căruia mi-am susținut prezentarea se găsește aici:
Deviant Hinge Epistemology and Epistemic Angst – second draft

Cercetari filosofice 111

Am scris asta inițial pe Facebook, dar m-am gândit să o păstrez și aici.

Mi-am închipuit următorul schimb de replici:
A: Listening to you play the piano is a torture.
B: So this is your confession!

(Wittgenstein, PU, §111: “Fragen wir uns: Warum empfinden wir einen grammatischen Witz als tief. (Und das ist ja die philosophische Tiefe.)”)

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Empirical actions (and some other things)

This is mainly an (yet unsuccessful) attempt to develop what I understood as a Wittgensteinean suggestion here for how we could justify claims of the form ‘I know that p’, where p describes what is happening in the speaker’s environment, by performing certain empirical actions. Since these are my personal notes, some other thoughts are intermixed. If you have any feedback, please leave a comment bellow.

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