Archive for the ‘concepte’ Category
Friday, January 8th, 2016
These are some notes which I wrote down in the last few months. I was thinking of writing a book, so I wrote in order to make the topic of my book a bit more clear. This is the only use of this text – to make it clear for myself what I am supposed to write about in my book. The only result of writing everything found here, which I would acknowledge, is that the title of my book should be ‘Reason, Language and Actions’. Nothing else should be taken seriously, nothing is worth mentioning etc. I did not proofread the text for grammar mistakes. If you want to take a look at it, you’re on your own.
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Posted in acte de vorbire, actiuni rationale, amintiri, cauzalitate, concepte, filosofia actiunii, filosofia limbajului, filosofia logicii, filosofia mintii, filosofie, idei, insemnari, intentii, metafilosofie, metastuff, naturalism, opinii, pragmatism, probleme, rationalitate, Wittgenstein | Comments Closed
Monday, February 23rd, 2015
There is nothing which I would claim to be true (or even acceptable) here, so I should not be quoted on any of the following lines. I wrote them down just to reflect on some topics (personal identity, responsibility, obligations, existence of God, theology of atonement, actions, intentions, reasoning, having a concept etc.) in my spare time. I am not posting these thoughts here because they could be of any use to someone else. It is just that I do not see why I should refrain from posting them here for my own use.
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Tags:actiuni, intentii, obligatii, persoane, raspundere
Posted in actiuni rationale, concepte, filosofia religiei, insemnari, intentii, metafilosofie, naturalism, rationalitate | Comments Closed
Wednesday, September 24th, 2014
Las aici însemnările pe care le-am făcut în vara asta la mare, fiindcă aşa mi-ar fi mai la îndemână să le revăd mai târziu. Nu consider că au vreo valoare intelectuală.
Posted in actiuni rationale, concepte, epistemologie, filosofia actiunii, filosofia limbajului, intentii, logica, metafilosofie, naturalism, obiecte mentale, pragmatism, rationalitate, senzatii | Comments Closed
Friday, July 11th, 2014
Posted in acte de vorbire, actiuni rationale, cauzalitate, comunicare, concepte, diverse, epistemologie, filosofia actiunii, filosofia limbajului, filosofia logicii, filosofia religiei, filosofia tehnologiei, idei, insemnari, intentii, logica, metafilosofie, naturalism, pragmatism, rationalitate, senzatii, Wittgenstein | Comments Closed
Thursday, May 29th, 2014
I’ve done the first one in an attempt to clarify my view of philosophy as a conceptual proposal:
The second expresses my thoughts about the dual nature of actions:
In the third case I was trying to think of the different ways in which we understand the idea if necessity:
They are related.
Tags:actions, conceptual proposal, dual nature, necessity, philosophy
Posted in actiuni rationale, amintiri, cauzalitate, concepte, diverse, filosofia actiunii, filosofie, idei, insemnari, metafilosofie, naturalism, pragmatism, probleme | Comments Closed
Monday, January 6th, 2014
Just some scribbles, nothing here is publishable.
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Tags:artifacts, philosophy, rules
Posted in concepte, filosofia actiunii, filosofia tehnologiei, idei, insemnari, intentii, naturalism | Comments Closed
Monday, January 28th, 2013
Ne-am putea astepta ca la aceasta intrebare sa primim un raspuns din partea oamenilor de stiinta. Astfel de raspunsuri exista. Sa ne intrebam, totusi, pe ce se sprijina ele.
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Posted in concepte, diverse, filosofia mintii, idei, insemnari, metafilosofie, naturalism, obiecte mentale, probleme, stiinta cognitiei | Comments Closed
Thursday, November 1st, 2012
Am pregatit pentru publicare un text bazat pe conferinta despre care vorbeam aici. Titlul e un pic modificat.
Posted in actiuni rationale, concepte, facultate, filosofia actiunii, filosofia limbajului, filosofia logicii, pragmatism, rationalitate, stiinta cognitiei, viata academica | Comments Closed
Thursday, July 12th, 2012
M-am jucat un pic cu Gephi:
Sagetile exprima relatia “intelegerea conceptului A presupune drept conditie necesara intelegerea conceptului B”. N-am fost consecvent in ce priveste tranzitivitatea relatiei respective (inca nu mi-e clar de ce).
Posted in concepte, filosofia actiunii, idei | Comments Closed
