Category Archives: epistemologie

A passing remark about belief attribution

cauzalitate, epistemologie, filosofia actiunii, filosofia mintii, idei, insemnari, opinii, probleme

Let us start with the following simple scheme of belief attribution:

Agent G does action A.
Belief B is a reason for doing A.
—-
Therefore, A believes B.

To take an example, suppose George eats a sandwich. A reason for doing so would be provided by the belief that sandwiches are nutritious, so we could attribute that belief to George.

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My problem with the Reason-Knowledge Principle

epistemologie, idei

Whatever your definition for ‘S knows that p’ is, I take it that p being true figures as a necessary condition in that definition. Now, according to my (perhaps inaccurate) understanding of the pragmatist tradition, for p to be (or ‘to become’) true, our actions based on p have to be successful. In other words, being conducive to successful action seems to be at least a necessary condition in a pragmatist analysis of truth.

Now, what does ‘acting on p’ mean? Could it be possible for someone to act on p but reject p as a reason for his or her actions? (I have tried to figure out such cases without success.)

So here comes my problem with the Reason-Knowledge Principle, as stated in Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason, Knowledge and Action, Journal of Philosophy, 105.10 (2008): 571-90.

RKP says that: “Where one’s choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p.”. Since the principle makes ‘knowing that p’ a necessary condition for treating p as a reason for acting, it would render all definitions of knowledge relying on the pragmatist view on truth circular.

However, shouldn’t such a principle be neutral with respect to our theoretical understanding of knowledge?

Un teaser

actiuni rationale, epistemologie, pragmatism

M-am tot gandit in ultimele zile la asta:

Insa intemeierea, justificarea dovezii ajunge la un sfarsit; – insa sfarsitul nu este faptul ca anumite propozitii ne sar in ochi in mod nemijlocit ca adevarate, asadar nu este un gen de vedere din partea noastra, ci actiunea noastra, care sta la baza jocului de limbaj. (Wittgenstein, Despre certitudine, 204)

Despre traversarea corecta la semafor (si alte insemnari)

acte de vorbire, actiuni rationale, epistemologie, filosofia actiunii, filosofia limbajului, intentii, logica, opinii

In cate feluri pot sa traversez gresit la semafor?

– trec pe rosu -> E limpede ca am gresit.
– trec printr-un loc in care nu exista semafor -> Nu as spune ca am traversat gresit la semafor, ci ca nu am traversat la semafor.
– trec printr-un loc in care exista semafor, dar nu si trecere de pietoni (exista semafor pentru masini, probabil) -> Am traversat la semaforul gresit. Sau s-ar putea spune ca a fost o greseala sa traversez pe acolo.
– traversez si apoi imi dau seama ca nu aveam ce cauta pe cealalta parte a strazii -> Am gresit traversand la semafor. A fost o greseala sa traversez.
– trec pe verde, fara sa fiu atent la semafor -> Intr-un sens, am traversat corect. Dar nu am facut tot ce trebuia pentru a traversa corect la semafor (nu m-am asigurat ca semaforul arata verde inainte sa trec).
– sunt atent la semafor, astept sa se faca verde, dar traversez inainte sa se faca verde -> Am traversat gresit fiindca nu m-am abtinut sa traversez atata timp cat era rosu.
– astept sa se faca verde, ma abtin sa traversez, dar incep sa trec abia cand semaforul pe verde clipeste -> Nu am traversat gresit, dar puteam traversa mai bine.
– trec pe verde, dar nu pe trecerea de pietoni -> Am traversat gresit la semafor fiindca am traversat gresit.
– cand ma hotarasc sa traversez e verde, asa ca nu mai astept sa se faca verde si nu ma abtin sa traversez -> Nu am traversat gresit la semafor.
– traversez pe verde, dar nu ma asigur ca nu vin masini -> Daca trebuie sa ma asigur ca nu vin masini la orice traversare, atunci am traversat gresit.
– trec pe verde pana la jumatatea trecerii, dupa care ma intorc -> Nu am traversat.
– traversez pe verde, dar e vorba de o trecere pentru pietoni iar eu merg pe motocicleta -> Nu am respectat regulile de circulatie. S-ar putea spune ca nu am traversat cum trebuia (mergand pe jos, pe langa motocicleta) sau ca am traversat prin locul gresit sau la semaforul gresit, desi, intr-un alt sens, am traversat corect la semafor.
– am inceput sa traversez pe rosu, asteptand in continuare, in timp ce traversam, ca semaforul sa arate verde -> Nu am traversat corect la semafor fiindca nu m-am abtinut sa traversez atata timp cat semaforul arata rosu.

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