Adica ultima incercare de a prezenta argumentul de aici si aici intr-o forma mai buna pe blogul asta. De data asta textul e scris in engleza. Motivele sunt doua. Unul este ca uneori am impresia ca ma pot exprima mai bine in engleza. Al doilea este ca chiar ma intereseaza reactiile critice si sper ca un text in engleza, fiindu-le accesibil mai multor oameni, va putea primi mai multe critici interesante.
Observatie: Textul nu e academic si nici nu intru in prea multe detalii si subtilitati. Am incercat sa pastrez lucrurile la nivelul discutiilor pe care le-am citit pe unele bloguri. In plus, textul a fost scris in vreo ora si ceva, in noaptea asta. S-ar putea sa mai aiba niste exprimari ciudate sau chiar gresite. Dar tot mi se pare mai limpede decat cele doua chestii pe care le-am scris deja. Having that in mind, happy reading! π
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In what follows I want to claim that there can be no empirical evidence either for or against the existence of God. By empirical evidence I mean any evidence accessible to our senses which could be used to establish some truths about facts.
We have used such evidence, for instance, to prove the hypothesis about Neptune’s existence or the one about the existence of atoms. What I want to say is that no such evidence can be produced to confirm or infirm the existence of God.
To support my claim I want first to point to an analogy. No set of factual descriptions could be used to argue that some event was, in fact, a murder. If we only describe the physical movements of different body parts and other objects belonging to the victim and to the assailant, we couldn’t say that we’ve described a crime of some sort.
To say that something was a murder we must interpret the facts in some way. We must say that some physical movements were in fact an action, that the agent knew what he or she was doing, that it was his or her intention not only to kill but to murder the other person and so forth.
Now, let’s imagine a person who does not believe that there are real murderers. Could we provide this person with enough empirical evidence for the existence or murderers? Would the confession of a murderer count as such an evidence? In short, I don’t think so.
Why is that? Well, because “x is a murder” is not the description of a fact, but an evaluation of a fact, based on an interpretation. “He confessed that he committed a murder” cannot mean anything else but “he confessed that he did the actions that led to the other person’s death and he interpreted his actions as a murder”. But he could, of course, be wrong. And if I don’t believe that there is such a thing as a murder, I could, of course, doubt his interpretation about his own actions.
If you find this example unacceptable, perhaps I could produce a better one. But these sorts of examples have only one purpose – to show you that some statements, although they look like factual statements, are sentences of a different kind. “Murderers exist” is not like “Atoms exist”.
In the same way, “God exists” is not a factual sentence. This sentence, for instance, is not equivalent to “An omniscient, all powerful, absolutely good person exists.” One could accept the later, based on some empirical evidence perhaps, but still reject the former.
To say that a person who displays all the evidence that he could posses some (or all of the) divine attributes actually is God takes and act of faith and a particular interpretation of the evidence that you have empirical access to. Without such in interpretation, no facts could prove to you that “God does exist.”
So, the analogy was this. A person might not believe, for instance, that there could actually exist some people who would take from others’ private property, knowing what they do and intending to steal. For such a person, no empirical evidence could count as a confirmation of the sentence “Thieves do exist.” In the same way, for a person who does not believe in God, there cannot be an empirical confirmation for “God does exist.”
Note that my argument does not rely on the fact that God is described as having infinite knowledge, power, goodness, while we cannot have empirical evidence for such infinite qualities.
It does not rely, either, on the distinction between “believing that God exists” and “believing in God”.
My point is that “God exists” assumes an interpretation of facts, and such an interpretation is not possible without a religious commitment, in the same way in which “Thieves do exist” cannot be accepted without a moral commitment of some sort.
An atheist could witness, for instance, all the biblical actions of Jesus Christ without becoming a religious person. And of course, a non-believer could become a believer due to letting himself persuaded by some events and interpretations, but this does not make those events count as “empirical evidence for God’s existence.”
Another analogy would run this way. Suppose you believe you exist. Suppose now that somebody shows you how you were made from some organic stuff closely resembling the stuff real humans are made from, in a secret lab. Suppose, in addition, that you are shown that you are, in fact, a computer and all your memories are fake. It is, of course, implausible that this could happen, but it is not inconceivable. Would this make you believe that you do not really exist? I don’t think so.
In the same way, if one does believe that God exists, no empirical evidence could change his opinion. There is a symmetry here. It is not possible in principle for the atheist or for the believer to reasonably change their opinion about God’s existence in view of some empirical evidence.
One could argue, of course, about which life would be a better life – the one lived by a believer or the one lived by an atheist. But this would be a different discussion.
Mie tot mi se pare ca doar o parte a argumentului tau tine. Da, cred, asa cum spui tu, ca un ateu nu poate fi nicidata convins de existenta lui Dumnezeu printr-o dovada empirica. bun
Dar, in sens invers argumentul nu cred ca tine (un credincios care devine ateu), iata de ce:
Putem imagina o persoana (educata si crescuta intr-o anumita religie, deci o presoana care crede in Dumnezeu) si care avand o anumita experienta si vazand aceasta lume, cu toate ororile care se intampla(crime, accidente, razboaie,copii bolnavi care mor nevinovati etc.), aceasta persoana deci, devine, sa spunem un ateu convins. Nu sunt, oare, aceste orori dovezi empirice care il conving de ceva?
Nu reprezinta aceasta situatie, foarte probabila, un contraargument la teza ta: In what follows I want to claim that there can be no empirical evidence either for or against the existence of God.?
Interesanta discutie si interesante exemple.
@ iulian c: exemplele pe care tu le dai (crime, accidente, razboaie,copii bolnavi care mor nevinovati etc.) nu mi se par a fi dovezi empirice. Nu cred ca s-a plecat de la ipoteza ca Dumnezeu e protectorul tuturor pe Pamant. Poti crede in Dumnezeu chiar si fara sa respingi ideea existentei acestor orori si/sau a faptului ca Dumnezeu chiar le accepta pentru pamanteni. S-ar putea ca exprimarea mea sa fi fost un pic ambigua, sper ca ai inteles punctul meu de vedere.
Otherwise, gramo, apreciez articolul asta. E bun. Dar spre sfarsit da impresia ca te-ai grabit si nu l-ai incheiat cum trebuie. Si mi se pare ca ai fost putin partial, nu ai analizat prea mult ipoteza inexistentei lui Dumnezeu. Dar bravo oricum.
nici eu nu pricep, marturisesc cu umilinta… probabil ca nu ne intelegem pe termeni, nu-mi dau seama. de pilda ’empiric’ – mai intai il definesti corect si apoi intelegi prin el cu totul altceva, destul de bizar. si apoi aluneci usor spre… uf, spre solipsism, aproape. acea chestie cu ‘n-as sti daca-s om sau computer’ (cum dumnezeu sa nu stii? totusi constiinta rationala e cel mai simplu lucru de probat, matrix-urile sunt raportari de o naivitate… sau chestia cu crima. uf, nu stiu ce sa zic. si sunt mai multe lucruri bizare, dar mi-e teama sa nu gresesc. nu, cred ca undeva la termeni trebuie sa fie piedica, sau atunci eu nu am inteles ce vrei sa spui
declaram in grup forfeit? π sau daca nu, te conjur, scrie-ne in frantuzeste ca noi suntem de lume veche π
“A person might not believe, for instance, that there could actually exist some people who would take from othersβ private property, knowing what they do and intending to steal. For such a person, no empirical evidence could count as a confirmation of the sentence βThieves do exist.β In the same way, for a person who does not believe in God, there cannot be an empirical confirmation for βGod does exist.β”
Sa zicem ca X si Y, urcandu-se intr-un autobuz, observa cum un individ baga mana in buzunarul unui calator. X zice: “E un hot”. Y zice “Nu exista hoti”.
Sunt de-acord cu Gramo ca X nu poate schimba parerea lui Y prin evidente empirice. Totusi, X si Y accepta amandoi existenta INDIVIDULUI CU CAMASA GALBENA CARE A BAGAT MANA IN BUZUNARUL UNUI CALATOR. Cu alte cuvinte: persoana EXISTA – alegerea e intre a o considera sau a nu o considera “hot de buzunare”.
Pseudo-disputa dintre credincios si ateu nu contine vreun element asupra caruia cei doi sa cada de-acord.
(Iar “Exista D-zeu” functioneaza cu totul altfel decat “Exista individul cu camasa galbena”. Pentru cel de-al doilea enunt – intr-o utilizare comuna a cuvintelor – evidentele empirice sunt indispensabile.)
busy day, raspunsurile vin mai pe seara
@iulian c.: am scris despre argument from evil (o varianta aparuta pe un blog) aici. in mare, aici Angie zice bine – acolo nu e vb de dovezi empirice.
p.s.: acum vezi ca nu sustineam lucruri atat de diferite? adica, si Gramo sustine ca intrebarea “Exista Dumnezeu?” e fara sens, daca e vazuta ca intrebare stiintifica (gen “Exista quarci?”), doar ca incearca sa dea argumente. π
@serban ionita: da, un credincios si cu un ateu ar putea, in principiu, sa cada de acord asupra tuturor faptelor, dar pe unele, cel putin, le vor interpreta diferit.
@Angie: “mi se pare ca ai fost putin partial, nu ai analizat prea mult ipoteza inexistentei lui Dumnezeu” – point taken.
@m: mai asteptam sa se pritoceasca povestea si o reluam. π
ar fi interesant (cel putin pentru mine) sa discuti intr-un post inrudit argumentul lui anselm, sau formalizarea acestui argument facuta de catre Godel
@crowley: Godel n-a formalizat argumentul lui Anselm; a dat alt argument, pur si simplu. π din cate stiu, majoritatea filosofilor din ziua de astazi cred ca argumentul lui Anselm este gresit;
exista incercari de a demonstra existenta lui Dumnezeu prin argumente a priori (Plantinga, Adrian Miroiu), dar punctul de pornire pentru aceste incercari il reprezinta un argument al lui Leibniz.
dar aici n-a fost vorba deloc despre argumente a priori, ci despre argumente a posteriori, bazate pe dovezi empirice.
p.s.: despre argumentul lui Godel am spus ceva aici; pe scurt, ca e gresit. π