- I assert that Hatsune Miku is my wife. - so I lie. This could be regarded as a fiction, perhaps.

- I assert that according to the fictional novel I have written, Hatsune Miku is my wife. - I could be saying the truth. Also, if I assert that according to the fictional novel I am about to write, Hatsune Miku is my wife, this would be a roundabout way of stating my intention to produce a certain fiction. I could be lying (this were not my intention) or I could be wrong about my decision to act on my intention a.s.o. Further analysis is needed here (do I refer to a fictional Hatsune Miku or to the actual vocaloid? How can I talk about the novel I intend to write? etc.).

- I pretend to assert that Hatsune Miku is my wife. - Perhaps I am talking to a baby or on a stage etc. If what I utter is just "Hatsune Miku is my wife." there are some conditions which have to be fulfilled for my utterance to be a pretension.

So this is why I want to talk about pretensions.

Sadly, Austin excludes pretentions from his speech act theory. But he could be wrong. 

What if 'to pretend that' could also be, when taken in some sense, an illocutionary verb? And if it is, what kind of illocutionary force would it make explicit?

In a play or in another special context one can pretend: 
- to issue an order, make a request etc.
- to congratulate somebody, present her condoleances to somebody a.s.o.
- to marry somebody, declare war,...
- to promise something,...
- to assert something,...

In short one can pretend that she performs any (or at least most) of the other illocutionary acts.
[I can also assert that I assert something and declare that I declare something, but not order that I order something or promise (as a promise, not as a form of assurance) that I promise something]

What does one do in pretending to perform an illocutionary act? One produces the appearance that one is performing the illocutionary act in question, while it is (in some way or another) obvious that he/she does not in fact perform the act.


There are other speech acts that can, in a sense, take other speech acts as objects. For instance, one can take back: an order, a promise, an assertion, a declaration etc. Retractions are an interesting category, but we are not concerned with them right now.

Also: one can say: If you arguments are convincing, I promise that I will agree with you. One can promise that one will perform another speech act (altough it seems weird to promise that you will promise something; I wonder why).

Back to our main topic, however, I wonder what the constitutive and regulative rules for performing a pretended illocutionary act are. One constitutive rule seems to be that it is obvious that the illocutionary act in case cannot be performed (we are not in a real church but at the theatre, I am not speaking to someone who can understand me, but to a baby etc.).

 
I do not believe that HM is a real person (altough it can be said that HM is, in a sense, real). Also, I believe that one can marry only a real person.

Analogy: In a play, during a fictional marriage ceremony, one could say "I marry X" while believing that X is only a fictional character and one cannot realy marry fictional characters, but only real persons.

Anyway, the point is that in order to be a force fictionalist, according to this view, one has to be a content fictionalist.

(Contingent existence of fictions vs. mathematical truths considered necessary.)

(the problem with fictionalism about possible worlds - Brock-Rosen)

(the phenomenological objection - see J. Stanley about autism)

*

"pretending to" vs. "pretending that" (something is the case): pretending to communicate with the baby vs. pretending that the baby understands me;

pretending to refer vs. pretending to assert

It is clear now that to pretend is not to perform a special type of illocutionary act. I can pretend, for instance, that I am busy. Or I can pretend to dig a hole in the ground (without doing it, of course). In doing so, I can let (or even encourage) someone else to form an opinion, but I am not communicating it (see Grice).

Pretending to perform an action might be regarded as an action, perhaps. But we can still talk about the success conditions for such actions.

Now: Can I pretend to be doing A by doing A? Suppose that I want someone to believe that I dig a hole in the ground. For this I actually dig a hole in the ground. Could it be said that I was pretending to dig a hole in the ground?

I cannot pretend to be taking a picture of you by actually taking a picture of you.

So this seems to be a necessary condition for the success of any pretension - you cannot pretend to be doing A if you are actually doing A.

In order for someone to pretend to be doing A some of the success conditions (or just necessary conditions) for doing A must be missing. I can pretend to take a picture of you when I am not using a camera, for instance.

Intention to pretend - I would not talk about this.

Pretending to assert (see also, pretending to perform other illocutionary acts; by from this it does not follow that by pretending to perform an illocutionary act we perform another illocutionary act).

So,... what are some necessary conditions for successfully asserting something? The most important which comes to mind is that in order for someone to successfully assert that p, p must be true. Other proposals: S must know that p (which is a stronger condition), S must believe that p (or merely accept that p), S must be addressing to someone, understand what she is saying a.s.o.

Truth can also be analyzed in terms of assertibility.

When I pretend to promise something I mustn't intend to keep my promise. Is this so? The case of expressives is distinct from this. There the answer is clear. The illocutionary act is meant to express a feeling or an attitude, so if I have the feeling or the attitude which I am expressing, I cannot be said to pretend to express it. But is this the same for the case of promises (or assertions)?

The title of my talk could be:

Force Fictionalism - Morals from Speech Act Theory

The structure:

1) What is the claim of (revolutionary) force fictionalism? 
2) What are the most important critiques against (revolutionary) force fictionalism?
3) What are the minimal necessary conditions for successfully pretending to assert that p (according to speech act theory)?
4) What can be said about (revolutionary) force fictionalism from this perspective?

*

pretending to assert p vs. producing the fiction that p; Example: I can pretend to assert that I am Napoleon (which is not to quote the sentence "I am Napoleon", of course). So I pretend to talk about me and say that I am Napoleon. It could also be said that I pretend to be Napoleon. On the other hand, I can produce the fiction that G. Stefanov is Napoleon. So I am talking about a fictional character (inspired, perhaps, by the actual G. Stefanov) and I say (in the character's or the narator's voice, that this fictional character is (or believes that he is) Napoleon.


*

The Oracle argument: "I will continue to talk as before" - this supports hermeneutic fictionalism.

Revolutionary fictionalism as the proposal to change the way in which we speak vs. as a proposal to change the way in which we conceptualize the way in which we speak (is the second a version of hermeneutic fictionalism?) 

*

I cannot pretend to be talking when I am talking. So what do I do when I talk to a few days old baby (or to my cat, for that matter? (suppose I am not uttering commands) Possible reply: I pretend to perform speech acts (or illocutionary acts).

One could say that I pretend to talk, though, if by talking one understands an act directed at someone who can understand the speaker.

On the other hand, it could be said that I am talking (in a similar way in which one is talking when alone) but I pretend that my talk is directed at the baby (or the cat, or a cup in my cupboard etc.), or that the baby can understand me.

I talk to a child about Santa. It could be said that I pretend to perform speech acts, but it could also be said that I pretend to refer to Santa (or that I pretend that the name "Santa" refers to someone).

Still, one can pretend to perform an action. Of course, any pretension to perform an action can be regarded as a pretension that one has a certain behaviour (digging a hole in the ground as an action vs. digging a hole in the ground as some sort of behaviour).

If the first case is true, than there can be pretensions as some sort of meta-actions.

*

Mark Richard about "piggy-backing" (in STAHF). In order to tell a child who believes in Santa, at a certain point, that her belief is wrong, I accept the fiction and talk, as in the respective fiction, and say "Santa does not actually exist". Of course I could have been saying, instead, outside the fiction, the name "Santa" does not actually refer to a white bearded fat man who brings gifts to kids on Christmas night or anything similar. By saying the second thing I could have achieved the same purpose. This does not imply that the second thing is synonimous with the first.

*

"The sun is rising." vs. "Yes, I will marry you. (said while play-acting)"

I know that the sun is not rising. Yet I say that the sun is rising. I do not feel like pretending (as I do in the second case, perhaps). "Feeling like pretending" - what is it like? Suppose I take a drug and I feel like pretending when saying "I am G. S." (because I believe I am someone else under the influence of the drug). Was I pretending that I was G. S.? Obviously not.


*


I pretend to do A.
B is a necessary condition for (successfuly) doing A.
---------
Therefore, I pretend that B.

(but I cannot pretend that B if B is the case)


I pretend to assert that the present King of France is bald.
The existence of a present King of France is a necessary condition for me asserting that the present King of France is bald.
---------
Therefore, I pretend that there is a present King of France.

But how could I pretend that there is a present King of France if there was a present King of France.

Suppose I falsely believe that France is a republic and in fact it is a monarchy. The answer would be that I was trying to pretend that there is a present King of France, but I did not succeed.

Suppose I am Ender. I believe I pretend to lead the fleet in a battle, but I am actually leading the fleet in a battle. But then, I failed to pretend to leed the fleet.

So, on cannot pretend that P if it is the case that P.

Another example.

I pretend to assert that 2 is smaller than 4 (in the same way in which I pretend to assert that Mario is less violent than Bowser). / compare with: I do not pretend to assert that, I assert it, but I only pretend to refer to an existent Mario and an existent Bowser.

Suppose that '2 is smaller than 4' being true is a neccessary condition for aserting that 2 is smaller than 4. 

It would result that I cannot properly (successfully) assert that 4 is smaller than 2.

*

deceptive vs. non-deceptive fiction

Fictional discourse vs. fictional literature (book)

See Urmson about the chess players who pretend to play a game of chess - there is no point in asking who won.

*

(s) 2 is an even number.

- Paraphrase (so that we can say (s) without refering to 2):

There is only one x, such that x is number 2 and (that) x is an even number.

- metafictionalism:

In the fiction of arithmetic 2 is an even number. (I can assert this. It is still not clear what am I referring to - what are fictional entities? what is their ontological status?. See other arguments against metafictionalism, telling a story vs. describing a story etc.).

- object-fictionalism:

I assert that every pair of objects can be equally divided in distinct groups x and y and no other group than x and y. 2 does not refer - it is just a prop to talk about how things are in the real world.

- figuralism:

"even number" is a prop, 2 is a representational aid...

- instrumentalism (force fictionalism):

In uttering (s) I pretend to assert that (s). (Searle: I also pretend to refer to 2 as an abstract entity, but I do not refer).

Now: in order to pretend to refer to 2 one must not actually refer to 2.
Failure of reference. In this case the failure of reference could be only due to 2's nonexistence (as an abstract entity). So in order to pretend that I am asserting that (s) I must believe that 2 does not exist.

What about the belief that 2 does not exist? One cannot analyze "2 does not exist" along fictionalist lines, since we are talking about a belief - the content of a belief cannot be some pretended speech act.

On the other hand. The belief that 2 does not exist (in the realm of abstract objects) is something philosophical. So a mathematician uttering (s) should have a philosophical belief.

One could reply that the sincerity condition is not constitutive. But we are not talking about the belief that 2 is an even number, but about the belief that there is no 2. 

Another reply: but beliefs are not necessarilty psychological states (see my "Unconscious beliefs"). The pretense behaviour (and other things the mathematician does) display the mathematician's belief (perhaps unconscious) that there is no 2.

What other condition could be responsible for the utterance of (s) being an unsuccesfull assertion of (s)?

*

So my view about fictionalism would go like this:

Fictional characters (and objects), abstract entities, moral facts, possible worlds and perhaps some theoretical entities do not exist. So how can we talk about them?

The fictionalist answer: We pretend to talk about them (and make-believe when we hear somebody else pretending to talk about them). 

[a short remark about hermeneutic vs. revisionary fictionalism: hermeneutic fictionalism is also revisionary, in a sense: it proposes that we conceive what we say when we speak of non-existent in some fictionalist way; by changing the way in which conceive our discourse we do in fact change our discourse (rejection of analytic - synthetic distinction works both ways - a change in our view of nature is a change in our concepts, but a change in our concepts is also a change in our view of nature) ]

Indeed, but how can we pretend to talk about nonexistents? We do utter words and sentences. We talk. So what do we pretend to do?

1) Content fictionalism: we pretend to refer to said entities. -> Ok, but what do we talk about, then?
a) We talk about fictions (metafictionalism). Ok, but what are fictions? ... (fictions are not less ontologically problematic than possible worlds, say. See other objections.
b) We pretend to refer to nonexistents in order to talk about existents (objects fictionalism). 
c) We speak in metaphors in order to talk about existens. It is like (b) but things are more complicated.

Objections: How do we really mean that there is an apple on the table and there is another apple on the table and there are no more apples on the table by saying that the number of apples on the table is two? If we adopt a representationalist view in semantics these problems are difficult. Inferentialism might come to the rescue here.

Etc.

Force fictionalism: we pretend to assert things about said entities (so the locutionary content is not asserted) - sure, one might wonder what the refering words and expressions in the locutionary content refer to, but compare:

(i) We pretend to play a game of chess (Urmson's example) - the woden pieces have the same rules for their use as in a regular play.

And:

(ii) We pretend to bake bread by using sand - the sand is used as if it was wheat flour, we might imitate some steps in the preparation of bread and skip others a.s.o.

(iii) We could pretend to play a game of chess by using rocks even if we were unable to say (from some point onward) what rock stands for what piece in the game of chess.

Fictionalism (generally speaking) brings on another problem: If we do not do what we appear to be doing, what do we do? Meta-fictionalism, content fictionalism and figuralism provide different replies to this question. Now, force fictionalism can also provide some replies:

a) We perform some sui-generis illocutionary act (different from assertion, for instance) - let's say, the act of pretended assertion (which is still an illocutionary act) (this was suggested by G. Currie) marked by the intention that the hearer does not believe, but make-believe that p. This approach must be supplemented by some sort of content fictionalism. 

According to this view non-deceptive pretension is what we can abstract from different cases of pretended assertions, pretended promises, pretended requests, pretended declarations of war, pretended congratulations etc. and also from pretended non-communicative actions. We are doing different things in each case, but all the things we are doing might have something in common (the fact that we are not doing what we appear to be doing and that our intention is that some interlocutor or wittness to our actions makes-believe that we are doing what we appear to be doing).

This can be criticized (compare pretending to promis with taking back a promise, for instance), but the point is that this reply leaves open the problem of content. So you cannot be a force fictionalism if you analyze fictional acts like this without also being a content fictionalist.

b) We pretend to perform some illocutionary act, although we perform none. The point of whether what we were saying was true cannot apply here (there is no point to ask who won a pretended game of chess - Urmson again). The content of a pretended illocutionary act is not presented at all. There is no point in asking what do the refering terms occuring in that content actually refer to. They do not refer. The relation between the content which we pretend to assert and some description of the world (formed by sentences about existence) is more like the relation between a fictional story and it's moral. 

Right but what about the case when the content is actually asserted? One could, of course, block this question by saying that if the content which we pretend to assert was actually asserted it would be meaningless. The game played at (iii) could not be actually played. It would not be a game.

Searle's treatment of fictional literature (see the distinction between fictional story and fictional discourse etc.) seems to suggest this treatment of fiction (although it seems to suggest other versions of fictionalism as well: metafictionalism and object fictionalism; Searle seems to believe that "to refer" is also an illocutionary act, but that is weird).

[I do not know what to say yet about Walton - he seems to reject the idea that speech act theory can tell us something about what we do when we pretend to be doing something / or when we pretend that something is the case; if this is the case, I must show why this position is going to be left aside in my talk]

Perhaps Belaguer gives an example of this sort of force fictionalism.

We pretend to assert p, but we do not assert p. If we were to assert p, we would be saying something meaningless. So we do not need content fictionalism. All the objections against content fictionalism, according to this view, do not apply to force fictionalism.

There are some objections left (see Jason Stanley).

However, what I am trying to say is that you cannot have force fictionalism without content fictionalism. Force fictionalism which stands on its own is untenable. For this I want to use some morals from speech act theory and a simple principle.

The principle:

In order to pretend to be doing A one must not be doing A. (See Ender's Game - you cannot say that Ender was pretending to be fighting the alien's fleet or that he was pretending to destroy their planet; this is what he believed, of course - he believed that he was pretending to do those things, but he was actually doing them, so he was not pretending to do them).

So in order to pretend to assert that p, you must not be asserting that p.
What does it mean that one is not asserting that p?

At least one of the constitutive conditions for p's assertion is not fulfilled. 
[also some necessary conditions for asserting that p might be required to be unfulfilled - see "saying something to a newborn baby or on a stage a.s.o. Sellars' distinction between uttering the words and saying that might also be helpful here, although I do not endorse his view about language]

What are the constitutive conditions for asserting that p?

(See: Searle's distinction between constitutive and regulative conditions comes from Austin's distinction etc.)

It is disputable, for instance, that knowing that p is a constitutive condition for asserting that p (see Timothy Williams' proposal and some objections). However, it does not seem disputable that in order to successfully assert that p one has to believe that p is true.

"Right, but we can have a fictional account of truth."

Ok, but the point is that one should be able to believe that p (or at least to accept that p). In this case, p must have a meaningful content.

In short: 
- in order to pretend to assert that p I must not be asserting that p.
- so I must break some of the rules for asserting that p.
- but the only rules which I can plausible break are rules which assume that p has a meaningful content. 

 It could, perhaps be replied that I do not break the rules, but produce some non-meaningful content such that the assumption of said rules if false, so the rules are not broken, but just do not apply.

However, pretending to assert that the number of the apples on the table is two seems different from pretending to assert that the off off prime of under is bigger than the sum of its upper limit (children pretending to be mathematicians might pretend to assert that).

"Right, but what does it mean that the two seem different? Can we found such a difference on a psychological impression?"

Of course not. We can present at least a part of ordinary arithmetic (ordinary arithmetic with addition only) in axiomatic form. The other pretended assertion is not part of any complete and consistent system. 

Completeness might not be so important here. The rules of the pretended game of chess in example (i) are consistently applied during the game, while in (iii) we do not consistently apply any rules during the entire game (one moves a rock and shouts "Check!", the other moves an adiacent rock, but she could just move another rock any number of squares; the problem is just how realistic do we want the pretended game of chess to be; also see: pretending to play the guitar or the piano in movies).

So the point I am trying to make is that even if we ignore the phenomenological critique which seems to apply to "deceptively pretending to stand alone force fictionalism", we could still argue that force fictionalism cannot stand alone. It has to be supplemented by some form of content fictionalism. I do not want to say that fictionalism is wrong, but whether it is right or wrong (as a proposal to change the way in which we conceive the way in which we speak about some non-existent objects) should be judged with respect to content fictionalism (also the success or failure of content fictionalism seems to depend rather on our ability to find way in which we could paraphrase the content of some pretended assertions, so fictionalism does not seem to add something really significant to good old instrumentalism (we had plenty of that last century); Bas van Fraasen and Hartry Field have constructed intresting attempts to paraphrase some discourses. That seems to be their main contribution.

Also, fictionalism seems to be (as A. Fine says) a way to block the best explanation argument for realism (in philosophy of science, at least). But one could argue like that and have most of the benefits of fictionalism without endorsing a fictionalist view about non-existent entities.

We find it useful to talk about numbers even if there are no numbers. I find it useful to talk about the circles in Hashiwokakeru as if they were islands and of the lines between them as if they were bridges when I want to teach someone the game. I could do it without talking like this, but it would be more difficult for me. It is easier to teach someone else the game in the same way in which I have learned it. Do I have to say that I am creating an useful fiction or taking part in a fiction? Do I have to say that when learning chess one might find the fiction of two armies having a battle useful?

*

So this would be a sketch for my presentation. There are still things to be done. The final considerations are not important. The most important thing is my argument that even that type of force fictionalism which seems to have the best chances of standing alone involves content fictionalism.

Numbers have properties which do not resemble any properties that physical objects have.
Fictional characters, by contrast, do have properties which real persons have. Although they could have properties which no real persons have or can have. For example: multifictional (Merlin) and single-fictional (Oblomov, supposing that no fan-fiction was written); but these are meta-properties - they apply only to fictional characters. Another exemple is needed here. 

Being prime is a property related to operations which we perform (but do not usually pretend to perform) with numbers. Being a piece which one can transform a pawn into is a property only a piece of chess has. A king is not such a piece, for instance. Being dead or alive is a property only a group of Go pieces can have, in a game of Go (real or replayed). 

So any "fiction" which introduces some rules and operations may create new properties. The king of chess does not exist, but it is a rule of chess that a pawn cannot be transformed into a king. One can learn the rule while manipulating wooden pieces (in the same way in which one can learn about prime numbers while manipulating symbols - yeah, this is a cross between formalism and conventionalism). If one tries to perform integer division with 7 and a smaller number she could be told "no, you cannot get any result by doing that, because 7 is a prime". This is not to pretend to assert that 7 is a prime. This is to convey a convention by saying something simple (compare to "Stealing is moraly wrong."). 

We teach babies and small children to speak by pretending to speak to them, but they do not learn to pretend to speak to someone who cannot understand them (although this is what we do). So even if what I would say I was doing in saying to my son "7 is a prime number", assuming that I was a fictionalist, was that I was pretending to talk about 7 in the same way I am pretending to be talking about Santa, my son would not learn to pretend to talk about numbers, but to talk about numbers.

Also, returning to my main argument, is it undisputable that abstract objects do, in fact exist? Let us take another example:

I can pretend to be talking about Santa precisely because I am sure that Santa does not exist. 
Suppose I am unsure whether God does exist or not (it is not my case, but...). Or let us take another example. Suppose I am unsure about the existence of Jesus Christ. I might talk about Jesus Christ, in order to evaluate the historical arguments for and against his existence (another historical character the existence of whom is disputed might make a better example). But do I pretend to be asserting things about Jesus Christ? Since I could be actually asserting things about him, I cannot be sure. I might intend to pretend and in fact assert something about him.

What is the moral of this? It seems to be that I can be a force fictionalism only if the non-existence of abstract objects, possible worlds, theoretical entities a.s.o. is undisputed. But it isn't. (I have read an argument about Davidson's treatment of adverbes somewere which I think was interestingly related to this. "interestingly related" - adverbs do not actually modify relations or states of fact).

*

My argument, one more time, is that force fictionalism cannot be accepted as a standalone form of fictionalism. It must be supplemented with a version of content fictionalism.

The main point is to show that one cannot claim that the locutionary content of the pretended assertion is meaningless. If one says that it could not be properly asserted, then I must have a good reply.

I got to this when it came out that one could pretend to do A when one does not do A because one of the assumptions of one of the neccessary conditions for doing A is not fulfilled.

Let us take another example. In order to open a locked door one must find a key fitting the lock on the door. Finding (not just having) a key fitting the lock is a necessary condition for unlocking the door. What is an assumption of this necessary condition? Well, of course, that a key fitting the lock does in fact exist (all the keys could be lost; we could break down the door, but not unlock it anymore). Now, in this situation I could, of course, pretend to unlock the door. 

Other examples could be useful.

*

Here I go again.

So, my main concern is to show that force fictionalism cannot be held without some form of content fictionalism. Why is important to do this? Because then the debate will be a bit easier. If no version of content fictionalism wins, then force fictionalism has no chance to win.

*

My argument against Walton:

(1) In order for something to be a fictional work (a kind of abstract artifact, one might say), at least one of the actions performed in producing (or modifying?) that work should be pretended. Suppose it wasn't. How would we distinguish, then between a fictional work and a non-fictional work? I am not sure this is a good argument, but am unable to provide a better one right now.

(2) Speech act theory can provide us with some conceptual instruments if we want to say what it is for some A to be pretended. Of course, SAT focuses on communicative acts, but it does not have to. So it should not be abandoned so easy. What are these conceptual instruments?

see Currie, for instance about the intention that the audience or witnesses of A should engage in make-believe (this is perhaps, the mark of non-deceptive pretension); also:
- some of the necessary conditions (or perhaps constitutive rules) for performing A should be broken (this is similar to the case of conversational implicature, indeed; do we want to say that pretended assertions conversationally imply something ontologically unproblematic? - not really; pretension might be involved in at least some conversational implicature, but it can function by itself as well);

What is the difference, then: pretending to assert that Santa lives at the North Pole vs. lying that Santa lives at the North Pole.

Well, I would be lying if Santa lived somewhere else. If I say that Santa lives at the North Pole I am not lying. What I say is neither true, not false. I pretend to say something about Santa, but I do not really say something about Santa. Nothing can be really said about Santa (according to the standalone force fictionalist).

What if I say that Santa will not come to me this year in order to convey the idea that I did not behave well recently? Now we have conversational implicature (the background knowledge plays an important role in this case) and pretension as well. However, there is no conversational implicature in "Santa lives at the North Pole", uttered in conversation with a kid. If the kid believes that Santa does exist, mine is a deceptive pretension. If the kid believes that Santa does not exist, mine is a non-deceptive pretension. It does not seem to matter what I believe in this case. Suppose that I believe that the kid does not believe that Santa exists anymore, but she does. My intention was to act a non-deceptive pretension, but I actually produced a deceptive pretension. It's that simple. So my intention that the kid would engage in a game of make-believe does not actually individuate the kind of pretension I am involved into. The other person's beliefs do. Similarly, when I believe that I pretend to say something to my baby (Sellars would perhaps say that I am not saying something, but am thinking out loud) and the baby already understands what I am saying, I cannot be said to pretend anymore to say something. My intention is not enough.

Were does this get us?

*

Foundations of illocutionary logic [...]

*

Having reasons to support the propositional content. When asserting that Santa lives at the North Pole I do not have reasons to accept the (truth of the) propositional content in question (Santa lives at the North Pole). If I try to assert that B. Obama lives in Romania, do I fail because I do not have reasons to believe what I try to assert to be true? Is it as if I did not make an assertion or as if I made a defective one? 

Compare with a promise which I do not intend to keep. I did promise because the audience accepted my promise. My intentions do not matter in this situation. What if it was a slip of the tongue? So I do timelessly understand what "I promise means", but in that situation I did not understand that I promise by saying "I promise". I was trying to say something else, perhaps. The audience accepted what I said as a promise. Did I promise?

The problem is: can I be held responsible for promising that p in such a situation?

Let us compare this with a different case. One in which I perform an action by mistake, so to speak. Suppose that I intend to prepare coffee but I make tea instead (perhaps I do not pay much attention to what am I doing, an explanation could be provided  for such a mistake in any case). Now, am I responsible for making tea or not? I could, of course, describe my action as "a failed attempt to make coffee", but the person I was trying to make coffee for might say that "you made tea". The dispute seems "too philosophical". 

In any case, my intention to assert that p might be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for asserting that p. If I lack the intention to do A I might not have done A (even if it appears so). But the presence of my intention is not sufficient. 

So suppose I intend to assert that Obama lives in Romania. Then I intend to lie (or mislead, in any case). Now suppose, instead, that I intend to assert that Dracula lives in Romania. I still intend to mislead. This could be called a deceptive pretension. I pretend, in other words that Dracula does exist, since "Dracula does exist" is an assumption of what I assert.

It could be said that I do not have good reasons to accept (or to believe) what I say because I knew that an assumption of my attempted assertion was wrong.

What if I pretend to assert that "Hoichi Poichi wonders [sic] in Broccoland."? What if I say something completely uninteligible as if I was making an assertion (by using the appropriate tone of voice)? Is there an appropriate tone of voice for making an assertion? Isn't this as if one cannot recognize from the moves what game are the kids pretending to play?

What if I say "I state that..." and then I utter something unintelligible? Could not one reply that I failed to pretend to assert something? In any case, even if I succeed to pretend to assert something in such a case, it is hard to claim that this is the way in which one is pretending to assert something when doing science (math included). But I want a stronger argument.

I want to say that in order to pretend to assert that p, p should be intelligible. "I state that bla-bla-bla" is not a pretended assertion yet. If I say that, I only pretend to say something, not to assert something. I could say that to someone, of course. It would mean "since you are going to make what you wish of my words, it does not matter what I actually say". Similarly with "I decree that bla-bla-bla". 

The illocutionary point of assertion - to say how things are. In order to pretend to assert something, then, you have to pretend to say how things are. 

So the Speech Act Theory also tells me that when I pretend to do A I must do something which seems to have the same purpose with A (but does not achieve the purpose of A). Maybe I cannot recognize what game do the kids pretend to play until I hear one of them shouting "Chessmate!". This is to pretend that the purpose of the game was achieved.

Compare: "Santa lives at the North Pole." with: "I imagine that Santa lives at the North Pole". Suppose that the first is an undeceptive pretended assertion. What do I do when I utter that sentence? I pretend to be describing a state of facts without actually describing anything. In the second case I actually describe a state of facts - that I am imagining something. If I were to write like that, it would not be fiction (unless it were not the case that I imagined what I said I did; but then it could be replied that I was using "to imagine" in a more restrictive sense; on could write, in the voice of a fictional narrator: "I see with my mind's eyes Santa living at the North Pole" without having any representations about Santa and the North Pole).

Back to my argument. Suppose one could pretend to assert that p without being able to assert that p. However, in order to pretend to assert that p one must pretend to describe a fact without actually describing it. Suppose that I believe that Vlad Dracul was also a fictional character and I say "Vlad Dracul lived in Romania" in the same way in which I would say "Dracula lived in Romania". I did not succeed to pretend to assert that Vlad Dracul lived in Romania because it is true that Vlad Dracul lived in Romania. The illocutionary point of my "pretended assertion" was in fact achieved, so my utterance cannot be fictional anymore. However, in order to make sure that the illocutionary point of assertion is not achieved, one should be able to see that the content of my assertion is false or that at least one of the referring expressions which I was using does not refer.

"But someone could make sure that I am producing a fiction by looking at the context of my utterance."

No, not really. Someone could see that my assertion is part of a fictional work by looking at the context of my utterance, but if my utterance is true, than it was an assertion, not a pretended assertion. (Sure it can be said that even if the utterance was true, it was not an assertion if it was made by a fictional character. But is this the case we are talking about? - When I say that 4 is even I do not produce the fiction of a mathematician uttering that 4 is even. 

"Why not?"

Let us compare:

4 is even, said Santa. 

And:

4 is even and there are four apples on the table, so there is an even number of apples on the table.

In the second sentence I speak about actual apples on an actual table. If anyone would claim that I utter "4 is even" as if it was produced by a fictional character, she would also have to contend that a fictional character could speak of actual tables.

"Does not the fictional Santa live at the actual North Pole? Isn't this the fiction of Santa living at the North Pole?"

I do not think this is what the fiction of Santa is about. 

Santa does not exist - we all agree to that.
The North Pole region does exist - we agree to that too.
"Fictional Santa lives in the actual North Pole region" could only mean that the fiction of Santa is largely told or talked about by actual people living in the North Pole region (which is false). Fictional characters cannot be located in the physical space in the same way in which actual people can be located. Fictional Dracula lives in fictional Romania and fictional Santa lives in a fictional North Pole region. Fictional characters cannot know or believe something about real facts or events. They can fictionally know something about fictional facts or events which might reduplicate actual facts or events. Fictional characters can only fight in a fictional World War II, no matter how much the events in the fictional WWII are similar to actual events in our real WWII. 

"But then a fictional work cannot contain descriptions of actual facts and events."

Indeed, it cannot. It only contains descriptions of fictional facts and events. We might know that some fictional facts correspond to some real facts (the fact that there is a Baker Street in London, for instance), but we do not care about such things when we read a fictional work. 

"So how can an author step outside her fiction?"

I do not know. Such literary complications are not related to our discussion, though. 

"Why not?" What if 4 is even is part of the fiction and the rest of the sentence (there are 4 apples on this table, so there is an even number of apples on this table) is told by stepping out of the fiction?"

Compare with: Dracula lives in Romania. By the way, Romania actually has less than 30 million inhabitans. So Dracula lives in a country with less than 30 million inhabitants. This would not be a valid argument. The former is a valid argument, the conclusion of which states something about actual apples on an actual table, so its first premise cannot be fictional (in the sense that it was uttered by a fictional mathematician). So "4 is even" cannot be analysed as "a fictional mathematician says that 4 is even."

"But it appears that that premise cannot be fictional in any other sense either."

But it can, if I can pretend to assert something about actual apples and tables. Suppose that I say: "The geometrical form of the surface of this table is a rectangle.". Now I am talking about the table in front of us. No fictional character could do this, but I am not a fictional character, so I can do it. The point is that in saying this I pretend to make an assertion about a real table. I pretend that the table has something which I call a geometrical form (which is not a physical object). I can, for instance, pretend that the actual table instantiates the abstract Platonic idea of a rectangle. Here the standalone force fictionalist would say that "the geometrical form of the surface of this table is a rectangle" only has a meaning in the context of my pretended assertion. If I would try to assert it for real, I would say something meaningless (similar to "green ideas sleep furiously", perhaps).

What I am trying to say is that one can create a fiction in which a fictional character says that green ideas sleep furiously, but one cannot pretend to assert that green ideas sleep furiously. 

"Why is it so?"

Because one cannot fail to believe that green ideas sleep furiously. One cannot fail to believe what one cannot believe. I cannot pretend to describe something by saying that green ideas sleep furiously, because what I say has no meaning. 

I do not like to talk about believing that p as if believing was a mental (psychological) state. I would say, instead, that to believe that p at some moment t is to opine that p (either out loud or to yourself) and to generally believe that p is to have a disposition to opine that p when asked whether p or not p. If I understand the meaning of "green ideas sleep furiously" I cannot opine that green ideas sleep furiously. But I cannot refrain from opining that green ideas sleep furiously. Let us take another example. I do not believe that Socrates could fly. This I can say or write. But I could not say "I do not believe that Socrates was prime." or "I do not believe that green ideas sleep furiously", for that matter. The question whether I believe such a nonsense or not does not raise.

So:

It can be the case that I do not have good reasons to accept that p only if it can be the case that I have good reasons to accept that p. But it can be the case that I have good reasons to accept that p only if p is meaningful. (I cannot pretend to be playing chess if there is nothing to stand for a piece of chess or a move in the game).

What I utter (p) must be something that can be used in the game of asserting that.... It should not be a description of a fact which does in fact occur or of an event which does in fact happen, but it must look like a description nonetheless. "There is an elephant in our room...." - now we can start a game of make-believe. p must state a logically possible fact, so to speak (even if an actual elephant could not fit in our room, a smaller elephant could). 

One could remain an instrumentalist with respect to mathematical statements, for instance, even if she accepts my argument against standalone force fictionalism. She could say that mathematical statements are meaningless so we cannot pretend to assert them, but then she could add that we should just give up using them.

Now what is the whole point of fictionalism?

I take it that the point regards the responsibility which one has to assume when talking about non-existents.

Foundations of illocutionary logic again [...]


*

I suppose they should say that a speaker who asserts that the King of France is bald is committed to having the belief that there is a King of France. Commitment is a larger concept than that of logical inference. One must be commited to believing the assumptions of what one says. 

So we want to be able to speak about non-existents without being commited to the belief that they exist. Fictionalism provides a solution to this. I can pretend to assert that the King of France is bald without being commited to the belief that there is a King of France.

One could, however, object that this is overkill. Think about making an allusion, for instance. I can allude that p without being commited to believing that p. Also, one can withdraw commitment from what one conversationaly implicates. Why couldn't one say 4 is even and then immediately add "But don't get me wrong, I do not claim that 4 does actually exist."?

On could, of course, but we do not usually feel the need to do that, even if we are anti-realists about mathematical objects. We do not feel the need to sever the link between our talk about mathematical entities and any ontological commitment towards such entities, so perhaps there is no link in this case. 

The link could be non-existent because we do not care about ontological commitments when we are doing math. It is true that we do not care about ontological commitment when we are writting or reading fiction, but the case of math could still be different. To conclude that it is the same would be an abduction. 

Suppose I read a quote. I do not know if it comes from a science-fiction book ar from a scientology lecture. Now I care about ontological commitment. Also, if I read a quote and I am not sure whether it comes from a numerology book or from a math treatise, I might be somehow troubled and wonder at the ontological commitments made. If I am sure it's math, I could cease to wonder (more in a NOA fashion than in an anti-realist fashion).

One can accept and use some results in math or in science without being troubled about the ontological commitments of those results. This blocks the argument to the best explanation for scientific realism (says A. Fine). One does not really have to be a fictionalist for this.

I can find it useful to talk about abstract (non-material) artifacts. It helps me to consider that concepts are artifacts. From here on I can apply some theory about the social construction of artefacts (like SCOT) to concepts. I do not care about any ontological commitment I might have about abstract artifacts. If one asks me "Oh, but do you really believe that abstract artifacts do somehow exist?", I can reply that I do not. If the other person insists about the way I talk (concepts are abstract artifacts), I do not know what to say. I do not feel the need to offer some justification for the way I talk. I think the other person must learn this language game. 

"But what language game is this? Are you sure this is a proper language game?"

Well, I am as sure as I am about the language game that I and my son use to play when we pretend to be fictional characters (or real people, for that matter, only other real people than those we actually are). The problem is that I am not sure that it is the same language game.

*

In a sense, we can see that Walton puts pretence at the level of "engaging into fiction", not at the level of producing fiction. But suppose a child produces a solution to a difficult problem and I do not believe the solution is good so I just pretend that the solution is good. If the solution is actually good, my make-believe fails to make it a fictional solution.

*

Pretending to refer vs. Pretending to assert
Content vs. Force fictionalism

See also pretending to address... 

Also, pretending is not necessarily engaging into fiction

Perhaps I should clearly say:
- why I do not consider the distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism important, or why am I interested in fictionalism as a conceptual proposal only;
- why am I focusing on standalone force fictionalism;
- why intentions as psychological states are not important here;
- why I think SFF does not work;
- how restrictive or how large is the concept of fiction one could employ here and how I see the relation between fiction and pretending;
- why the cut between ontological commitment and talking about something could be due to a more pervasive practice than engaging in fiction. 
... 

*

Pretending to...  vs. pretending that... 

I pretend that it is too hot in my room by making the same gestures I would make if that were the case. I do not pretend to use a fan, I just use it. The fan is a prop, perhaps. So I could engage into the fiction "It is too hot in here" by performing some actions, none of which was pretended. 

Still, one could say that I was pretending to cool myself. So the point is this: 

Any "pretending that" can be described as some "pretending to". 

Reply: "What about pretending that some natural event takes place?" 

Well, it is the same. I perform a pretended action as if I was affected by that event. I pretend to be shaking from an earthquake, for instance. All depends on how I describe my action. 

Counting. At first, Razvan was only able to count stairs (a particular set of stairs, perhaps). After a while he was able to count other things. Only after that was he able to count without counting something, to say the numbers as if he was counting something. Was he engaged in the fiction "I am counting some indefinite particulars"? The point is that even if he had the appropriate intentions (so to speak) that would not have been enough. 

"Right, but if he had nothing in mind about a game of make-believe"? Well, I am not sure that when he was 3 and pretending to be a character from a computer game he had the intention that we engage in a game of make-believe. This is a pretty sophisticated intention. 

[...] 

"So, if he was not pretending to count indefinite particulars, what was he doing?". 

Sellars: He was thinking out loud. Not talking, but not pretending to talk either. After all the next step from this episode is taken when the child learns to think for himself (this 
is what happened with Razvan). 

*

You do not need to know chess (or math) to pretend to be playing chess or doing math. However, you need to know how to count particular things in order to count. 

Our fiction can be more or less realistic. 

*

pretending to assert / refer vs. engaging into fiction;
make-believe as a propositional attitude;
deciding whether something is fictional or not vs. deciding whether to keep track of the ontological commitments of a discourse or not - two different practices;
there may be other ways to block the argument to the best explanation for realism (about some nonexistents) than giving up to fictionalism;

deciding whether something is fictional or not vs. deciding whether to keep track of the ontological commitments of a discourse or not - two different practices


Suppose one could pretend to assert that p without being able to say that p. [...]