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Stefan, eu nu spun ca o critica morala a
nevoilor ar fi compatibila cu ceea ce astazi este predicat ca liberalism
sau libertarianism (si, daca intelegem prin 'liberalism' numai asa ceva, atunci
Silviu are dreptate ca 'se' spune numai o parte de adevar, dupa cum si
socialismul aplicat astazi in politici peste tot in lume nu prea are legatura cu
ce spuneti voi de obicei, tu si Silviu), ci ca o critica morala a nevoilor
nu este incompatibila cu propozitiile praxeologiei - care sunt formale si
instrumentale, nu presupun neaparat un 'continut' anume al nevoilor. Am mai spus
ca o critica a nevoilor va duce la schimbari - considerate obiectivist - in
economie, numai ca nu va fi nici o problema cu privire la gradul de satisfactie
al consumatorilor daca acestia internalizeaza critica respectiva (sunt fiinte
autonome intr-un mai mare grad). Am mai sugerat ca o critica absoluta - mai bine
zis, completa - a nevoilor nu este posibila, deci nu vad nici o dificultate
legata de prima fraza subliniata de tine mai jos.
Il citezi pe Mises, in pasajul
de mai jos, foarte bine in sprijinul afirmatiilor tale, dar nu neaparat
impotriva alor mele, fiindca nu sunt neaparat de acord cu tot ce spune
Mises. Eu iau ca centrala teza subiectivitatii economice pentru ca mi se
pare relevanta nu numai politic si economic, ci, extrem de important, moral -
este implicata autonomia vointei. Falsul principiu moral al heteronomiei vointei
este de asemenea vizibil aici: nu sunt liber (pozitiv) pentru ca imi vad nevoile
ca obiective - vorba lui Platon, 'oameni care nu cred decat ce pot tine in
maini'... (Astfel, propozitiile praxeologiei, bazate pe asa ceva, nu intra
in contradictie cu o critica morala a nevoilor. Nu spun ca, in alt sens, a vorbi
despre nevoi in sens obiectiv - anume cand vedem bine ca altcineva se concepe
'sub' nevoi - nu este ok. Dar asta este o dicutie pe care am sugerat-o undeva,
fara sa fi fost pana acum atinsa.)
Acum, ce mi se pare nasol in ce
spune Mises mai jos, nu este ce ai subliniat tu, ci asta: "Many foolish things have been said and written
about luxury. Against luxury consumption it has been objected that it is unjust
that some should enjoy great abundance while others are in want. This argument
seems to have some merit. But it only seems so. For if it can be shown that
luxury consumption performs a useful function in the system of social
cooperation, then the argument will be proved invalid. This, however, is what we
shall seek to demonstrate." Vorbeste ca si cum singurul lucru care ar putea
legitima statutul luxului ar fi functia economica. Dar chiar
economia in cadrul careia luxul poate fi legitimat ca functie nu este posibila
in absenta culturii libertatii (lucru cu care este de acord si CC, cu toate
ca el tinde sa minimizeze conditia asta culturala). Ca luxul de astazi este
nevoia de maine (subiectivism) este o descriere a ceea ce se intampla in
momentul de fata, nu decide ce anume trebuie sa fie. Subiectivitatea valorii
economice exprimata prin relativism lux/nevoie poate fi pusa si asa: lux, nevoie
sunt relative, deci NU este necesar ca ceea este astazi lux
sa devina maine nevoie - depinde de cum se privesc oamenii la un
moment dat pe ei si cum inteleg fluxul cultural-istoric care a creeat iluzia ca
bunul X este necesar ("dar, uite, acum un secol asta era lux, iar acum doua
secole, oamenii nici nu aveau asa ceva!"). Si pana aici, repet,
inca nu a avut loc o reflectie asupra a ce trebuie sa
fie.
La observatia ta din celalalt
mesaj, cred ca raspunsesem deja (autocitat):
"Un alt lucru
neclar in ce spusesem anterior este ca am lasat sa se
inteleaga ca
intotdeauna, in cazul CS, saracii vor iesi in pierdere, pentru
ca efectele
perturbarii economiei i-ar afecta mai mult decat ar putea ei
beneficia de
banii primiti. Nu intotdeauna ar fi asa. Daca, de exemplu,
sumele impozitate
ar fi mici (perturbare restransa a economiei), iar numarul
saracilor - de
asemenea mic, este de asteptat ca diferenta dintre sumele
primite si cele
pierdute prin cresterea generala a preturilor sa le fie
favorabila. Eficienta
masurii poate fi insa chestionata in felul indicat mai
sus: altii vor fi
afectati negativ. Veti spune, poate: 'da, dar asta este
redistribuirea!'.
Diferenta ramane intre CC si CS in modul in care se face
redistribuirea; in
CS nimeni nu este intrebat daca vrea ca banii sa le fie
luati si 'donati'
saracilor. Veti spune: 'da, dar asta nu priveste eficienta
redistribuirii,
noi nu discutam probleme de drept!'. OK, ma limitez atunci
la observatia - o
luati cum vreti - ca gradul de satisfactie al
consumatorilor (deci si
eficienta economica) pe piata depinde in mod direct
de respectarea
drepturilor: nimeni nu va fi satisfacut economic daca ii sunt
incalcate
drepturile (prin masuri zise, de cele mai multe ori, cu caracter
economic -
socialistii spun de obicei jumatate de adevar sau chiar
mai
putin)."
Daca faceti in
mod corect distinctia intre problema eficientei economice si problema dreptului,
atunci trebuie sa sesizati corect si modurile de a vorbi - contextele
- in care distinctia asta nu se aplica (de ce facem distinctia asta?
care-i intinderea valabilitatii ei?).
Stefan
C
despre diferentele de capital si despre ideea lui
Stefan Cojocaru ca putem face o critica morala a consumului de lux pentru a-i
ajuta pe altii: extras din Mises - "Liberalism" (sublinierile
mele)
As vrea sa mentionez ca eu nu-l gasesc pe Mises tot
atat de "dezgustator" ca Silviu, dar il folosesc ca sa il contrazic pe
Stefan Cojocaru :-).
1
The Foundations of Liberal Policy
5 The Inequality of Wealth and Income
What is most criticized in our social order is the inequality
in the distribution of wealth and income, There are rich and poor; there are
very rich and very poor. The way out is not far to seek: the equal
distribution of all wealth.
The first objection to this proposal is that it will not help
the situation much because those of moderate means far outnumber the rich, so
that each individual could expect from such a distribution only a quite
insignificant increment in his standard of living. This is certainly correct,
but the argument is not complete. Those who advocate equality of income
distribution overlook the most important point, namely, that the total
available for distribution, the annual product of social labor, is not
independent of the manner in which it is divided. The fact that that product
today is as great as it is, is not a natural or technological phenomenon
independent of all social conditions, but entirely the result of our social
institutions. Only because inequality of wealth is
possible in our social order, only because it stimulates everyone to produce
as much as he can and at the lowest cost, does mankind today have at its
disposal the total annual wealth now available for consumption. Were
this incentive to be destroyed, productivity would be so greatly reduced that
the portion that an equal distribution would allot to each individual would be
far less than what even the poorest receives today.
The inequality of income distribution has, however, still a
second function quite as important as the one already mentioned: it makes
possible the luxury of the rich.
Many foolish things have been said and written about luxury.
Against luxury consumption it has been objected that it is unjust that some
should enjoy great abundance while others are in want. This argument seems to
have some merit. But it only seems so. For if it can be shown that luxury
consumption performs a useful function in the system of social cooperation,
then the argument will be proved invalid. This, however, is what we shall seek
to demonstrate.
Our defense of luxury consumption is not, of course, the
argument that one occasionally hears, that is, that it spreads money among the
people. If the rich did not indulge themselves in luxuries, it is said, the
poor would have no income. This is simply nonsense. For if there were no
luxury consumption, the capital and labor that would otherwise have been
applied to the production of luxury goods would produce other goods: articles
of mass consumption, necessary articles, instead of "superfluous"
ones.
To form a correct conception of the social significance of
luxury consumption, one must first of all realize that the concept of luxury
is an altogether relative one. Luxury consists in a way of living that stands
in sharp contrast to that of the great mass of one's contemporaries. The
conception of luxury is, therefore, essentially historical. Many things that
seem to us necessities today were once considered as luxuries. When, in the
Middle Ages, an aristocratic Byzantine lady who had married a Venetian doge
made use of a golden implement, which could be called the forerunner of the
fork as we know it today, instead of her fingers, in eating her meals, the
Venetians looked on this as a godless luxury, and they thought it only just
when the lady was stricken with a dreadful disease; this must be, they
supposed, the well-merited punishment of God for such unnatural extravagance.
Two or three generations ago even in England an indoor bathroom was considered
a luxury; today the home of every English worker of the better type contains
one. Thirty-five years ago there were no automobiles; twenty years ago the
possession of such a vehicle was the sign of a particularly luxurious mode of
living; today in the United States even the worker has his Ford. This is the
course of economic history. The luxury of today is the
necessity of tomorrow. Every advance first comes into being as the
luxury of a few rich people, only to become, after a time, the indispensable
necessity taken for granted by everyone. Luxury consumption provides industry
with the stimulus to discover and introduce new, things. It is one of the
dynamic factors in our economy. To it we owe the progressive innovations by
which the standard of living of all strata of the population has been
gradually raised.
Most of us have no sympathy with the rich idler who spends his
life in pleasure without ever doing any work. But even he fulfills a function
in the life of the social organism. He sets an example of luxury that awakens
in the multitude a consciousness of new needs and gives industry the incentive
to fulfill them. There was a time when only the rich could afford the luxury
of visiting foreign countries. Schiller never saw the Swiss mountains, which
he celebrated in Wilhelm Tell, although they bordered on his Swabian
homeland. Goethe saw neither Paris nor Vienna nor London. Today, however,
hundreds of thousands travel, and soon millions will do
so.
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