Am lucrat mai demult la asta, acum cateva zile am revazut un text mai vechi si l-am trimis pentru publicare. Rezumatul textului arata cam asa:
I try to suggest, in my paper, that cognitive propositional attitude verbs, when uttered in first person, can be regarded as expressing the illocutionary force of an explicit speech act. For this, I first show how a sentence of the form ‘I believe that p’ can pass Austin’s ‘hereby test’.
Secondly, I emphasize two different uses of the first person propositional attitude utterances and point to the relation between these uses and two kinds of speech acts – expressives (or behavitives) and assertives, respectively. In the second part of the
paper I try to indicate how my approach could be used to solve some of the problems traditionally related to propositional attitude statements, including Frege’s puzzle of substitutivity.
For this, I suggest that sentences of the form ‘X believes that p’ should be regarded as reporting on speech acts which X has (or could have) done. In the end of my paper I hint at a few ways in which my pragmatic approach of propositional attitudes could be further developed.
Iar textul e aici.